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Abstract
The present article has two main goals. First, it attempts to contribute to the linguistic 
research on parentheticals by drawing attention to some constraints on syntactic paren-
theticals, i.e. parenthetical comment clauses including a predicate (verb or adjective) ex-
pressing the propositional attitude and/or source of the information presented in the host 
clause into which the parenthetical comment is interpolated or which it follows. Second, it 
offers an analysis illustrated with data from English and Polish which derives the observed 
constraints from the cognitive mechanisms independently argued for in Relevance Theory, 
thus offering support for the approach to syntactic parentheticals taken in this pragmatic 
framework. The constraints focused on here include: (a) the requirement that the paren-
thetical comment be upward-entailing on the epistemic scale of the strength of speaker 
commitment; (b) the requirement that the host proposition update the common ground 
and (c) the requirement that the propositional attitude of the speaker to the host clause 
proposition be indicated with mood markers. All of the constraints are argued here to stem 
from the nature of the cognitive inferencing mechanisms that guide verbal communica-
tion and in particular, from the necessity – in certain communicative contexts – of access-
ing the illocutionary force, the propositional attitude of the speaker’s utterances, and the 
strength of the speaker’s commitment for the purposes of meeting the hearer’s expectations 
of relevance. Building on Wilson (2011), evidential parenthetical comments are argued 
here to communicate that the speaker’s information is well-evidenced and demonstrate the 
speaker’s reliability.
Keywords
parenthetical comment clauses, Relevance Theory, commitment, epistemic vigilance
Streszczenie
Artykuł omawia ograniczenia, którym podlegają parentetyczne ciągi komentujące 
(tj.  parentetyki stanowiące zdania, w  których orzeczenie jest wyrażone czasownikiem 
opisującym postawę epistemiczną mówiącego względem propozycji zawartej w zdaniu 
głównym, w którego obrębie parentetyk się znajduje) i argumentuje (na podstawie da-
nych z języka angielskiego i polskiego), iż analizowane ograniczenia wynikają z postulo-
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wanych w teorii relewancji mechanizmów poznawczych, z których korzystają uczestnicy 
procesu komunikacji, gdy zachodzi potrzeba oceny siły illokucyjnej wypowiedzi, posta-
wy epistemicznej mówiącego i  stopnia gotowości mówiącego do zaspokojenia oczeki-
wań stosowności przez odbiorcę danego komunikatu. Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że: 
(a) parentetyk wchodzący w skład wypowiedzi epistemicznej może zawierać tylko funk-
tor epistemiczny implikujący przekonanie mówiącego, że zachodzi stan rzeczy, o jakim 
mówi, (b) propozycja wyrażona w zdaniu głównym musi się przyczyniać do uaktualnie-
nia wspólnego dla mówiącego i odbiorcy danego komunikatu kontekstu interpretacyj-
nego wypowiedzi i (c) postawa epistemiczna mówiącego względem propozycji zawartej 
w zdaniu głównym musi być przedstawiana za pomocą zdań z czasownikiem w formie 
osobowej, gdyż tylko taka forma gramatyczna pozwala na tworzenie trybu czasownika, 
dzięki któremu jest wyrażany stosunek mówiącego do treści wypowiedzenia. Artykuł 
dowodzi, że rolą parentetycznych ciągów komentujących zarówno w języku angielskim, 
jak i  polskim jest sygnalizowanie odbiorcy komunikatu wiarygodnej postawy mówcy 
względem wypowiadanych treści. 
Słowa kluczowe
parentetyczne ciągi komentujące, teoria relewancji, zaangażowanie mówiącego, czujność 
epistemiczna
1. Background: parenthetical predicates and their 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties
Following Urmson (1952), verbs such as think, believe, suspect, etc. are gener-
ally analysed as parenthetical and as such, they have an interpretive effect on 
the propositional content of the clause that they combine with. The general-
ly accepted view is that parenthetical clauses, i.e. clauses with a parenthetical 
predicate, a verb or an adjective, mitigate the speaker’s epistemic commitment, 
i.e. they modify or weaken the claim to the truth of a simple assertion p con-
tained in the clause that the parenthetical clause modifies. Thus, while B is fully 
committed to the truth of the proposition she offers in an answer to A’s ques-
tion in (1a), in all of the utterance in (1b)−(1j), the degree of her commitment 
is weaker (cf. Simons 2007: 1036):1
(1) A: Who was Louise with last night?
B:  a. She was with Bill.
 b. Henry thinks/I think she was with Bill.
 c. Henry believes/I believe she was with Bill.
 d. Henry said that she was with Bill.
 e. Henry suggested that she was with Bill.
1 In (1b)‒(1j), it is the embedded clause that is the main point or information focus of the 
utterance, but in other contexts, the main clause with a parenthetical verb may have the main 
point status (cf. Simons 2007: 1036):
(i) A: What is bothering Henry?
 B: He thinks that Louise was with Bill last night.
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 f. Henry hinted that she was with Bill.
 g. Henry imagines/I imagine that she was with Bill.
 h. Henry supposes/I suppose that she was with Bill.
 i. Henry heard/I heard that she was with Bill.
 j. Henry is convinced/I’m convinced that she was with Bill.
When the embedded clause has main point status, as in (1b)−(1j), the 
parenthetical clause, which is the main clause, carries information about the 
source and/or reliability of the truth of the embedded proposition and can thus 
be taken to have evidential meaning.2 For example, by using the parenthetical 
verb the speaker of (1d) indicates that the source of the information in the em-
bedded clause is Henry and that its truth is as reliable as Henry can be taken 
to be reliable. By indicating Henry as the source of the information, the speak-
er conveys that she is not to be taken to be (fully) responsible for the truth of 
the embedded proposition p. According to Simons (2007: 1037), the oddity 
of the utterances in (2) offered as answers to A’s question in (1) follows from 
the fact that hopes and wishes generally do not provide good evidence for the 
reliability of the truth of the clause constituting the main point of the utter-
ance, i.e. the embedded clause:
(2) a. (?)Henry hopes/I hope that she was with Bill.
b. ?Henry wishes that she was with Bill.
However, parenthetical main clauses are not restricted to expressing only 
speaker commitment or source of knowledge. As pointed out by Hooper and 
Thompson (1973), Ifantidou (2001) and Rooryck (2001), among others, a par-
enthetical predicate can also indicate a degree of probability, indicate speaker’s 
concession, mark politeness, carry an emotional or subjective evaluation such 
as (dis)approval, or serve to express speaker’s surprise or to attenuate hearer’s 
surprise, which Rooryck (2001) refers to as the surprisal meaning, etc. This 
suggests that in parentheticals, verbs undergo a change of meaning towards 
a purely evidential or evaluative meaning (Rooryck 2001: 128). Some examples 
from Hooper and Thompson (1973: 478), Rooryck (2001: 128) and Simons 
(2007: 1051) are given in (3):
(3) a. It is likely that Kissinger is negotiating for peace.   [probability]
b. We are pleased to announce that your visa has been renewed. [politeness]
c. I am afraid that your insurance policy has been cancelled. [surprisal]
2 Understood narrowly, evidentials indicate only (the type of) the source of evidence for 
the proposition expressed, e.g. hearsay. On the broad definition of evidentiality (cf., among 
others, Ifantidou 2001; Rooryck 2001; Speas 2004), evidentials indicate (the type of) the 
source of evidence for the proposition expressed and/or the degree of its reliability/prob-
ability/certainty. See Ifantidou (2001) and Rooryck (2001) for discussion of the range of evi-
dential meanings. 
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A clause with a parenthetical verb need not appear preceding the clause that 
it combines with, as shown in (4) and (5). Interpolated into the host clause or 
following it, a parenthetical clause is generally taken not to have the main point 
status. Rather, it is the host clause that is focused (cf., among others, Grimshaw 
2011; Simons 2007) in such structures, which I will refer to as syntactic paren-
theticals here after Simons (2007).3 Also in sentence-medial or sentence-final 
positions, parentheticals express evidential meanings, including the degree of 
the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the host proposition (cf. (4a)) or the 
source of the information (cf. (4b)), as well as additional emotional and evalu-
ative meanings, as demonstrated in (5) from Rooryck (2001: 128):
(4) a. Jules is back, I think.   [speculative]
b. Jules is back, they say.   [hearsay]
(5) a. Jules is back, can you imagine!  [surprisal]
b. Jules is back, I’m sorry to say.  [surprisal]
Although parenthetical predicates contribute evidential or evaluative 
meanings to the utterances in which they occur, i.e. have interpretive effects 
on the propositions that they combine with, sentences with main clause par-
enthetical predicates (cf. (1)−(3)) are often distinguished from syntactic par-
entheticals (i.e. structures with a parenthetical clause interpolated or following 
the host clause) such as (4)−(5) in view of a number of special grammatical, 
semantic and pragmatic properties (cf., among others, Ifantidou 2001; Grim-
shaw 2011; Hooper and Thompson 1973; Rooryck 2001; Ross 1973).4
From the syntactic point of view, while the complementiser that, an indica-
tor of a subordinating relation, is always available is (1)−(4), in constructions 
like (5), which are referred to here as syntactic parentheticals after Simons 
(2007), the complementiser that is unavailable, as demonstrated in (6b)−(6c):
(6) a. They said (that) it was raining hard.
b. *That it was, they said, raining hard.
c. *That it was raining hard, they said.
When the main point clause is a question, it must have interrogative syn-
tax, unlike embedded questions, regardless whether they have the main point 
status or not. Furthermore, the interrogative complementiser whether, which 
could flag the main point clause as a question, is disallowed (Grimshaw 2011):
3 Ifantidou (2001) refers to such parentheticals as genuine.
4 An early account focusing on the grammatical properties of syntactic parentheticals is 
Ross (1973), where parenthetical verbs are analysed as slifting (for ‘sentence lifting’), i.e. as trig-
gering the lifting of the complement clause in the syntax. A more recent study focusing on the 
grammatical properties of syntactic parentheticals is Grimshaw (2011).
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(7) a. He wondered whether she had made a mistake/*whether had she made a mistake.
b. Had she made a mistake, he wondered.
c. *Whether she had made a mistake, he wondered.
d. *Whether had she made a mistake, he wondered.
In addition, unlike in constructions with a parenthetical verb in the main 
clause such as (1)−(3), where the embedded clause need not be finite, in syn-
tactic parentheticals, the host clause must be finite, i.e. it must be marked for 
illocutionary force (Grimshaw 2011; Hooper and Thompson 1973):5
(8) a. I promised them that I would leave.
b. I would leave, I promised them.
(9) a. I promised them to leave.
b. *To leave, I promised them.
(10) a. I insisted that she learn to sing.
b. *That she learn to sing, I insisted.
 On the semantic side of things, the non-parenthetical or host clause in 
syntactic parentheticals is a semantic argument of the parenthetical, which is 
unsaturated in the absence of the host (Grimshaw 2011):
(11) a. They surmised that Mary was a talented singer.
b. Mary was a talented singer, they surmised.
c. *They surmised.
Furthermore, there are selectional restrictions between the parenthetical 
clauses and the hosts into which they interpolate or which they follow, which 
are analogous to the restrictions that main parenthetical verbs impose on 
their semantic arguments syntactically encoded as complements. Only predi-
cates that allow propositional complements can combine with declarative host 
clauses in syntactic parentheticals and only predicates that allow interrogative 
complements can combine with interrogative host clauses in syntactic paren-
theticals:
(12) a. Mary believed/*wondered that Harry would like the film.
b. Harry would like the film, Mary believed.
c. *Harry would like the film, Mary wondered.
5 In view of the syntactic differences between the sentences with predicates used paren-
thetically as main clause verbs embedding a  complement (cf. (1b)‒(1j), (3)) and syntactic 
parentheticals (cf. (4)‒(5)), I  will assume here the host clause has the main clause status in 
the latter. However, as this issue does not bear on the problems discussed in this paper, I will 
remain agnostic about the derivation of syntactic parentheticals, but see Rooryck (2001) for 
an overview of different approaches to how syntactic parentheticals arise in the grammar of 
natural language.
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(13) a. Mary wondered/*believed whether Harry would like the film.
b. Would Harry like the film, Mary wondered.
c. Would Harry like the film/*Mary believed.
Grimshaw (2011) takes the existence of a selectional relationship, whereby the 
parenthetical predicate semantically selects the semantic type of the host as ev-
idence that the host clause is a semantic argument of the syntactic parentheti-
cal. Assuming that the host is the semantic argument of the parenthetical pred-
icate, if a pro-form such as so or it that occurs in the parenthetical clause fills 
the position of that argument, the host clause and the pro-form are incompat-
ible, as they compete for the same argument position. This is shown in (14b) 
from Grimshaw (2011).6
(14) a. Is Mary a talented singer? The students said/thought *(so).
b. Mary was, the students said/thought (*so), a talented singer.
Apart from their special syntactic and semantic properties, syntactic par-
entheticals are also special from the pragmatic point of view. Although the 
host clause has often been analysed as an assertion (cf., among others, Urm-
son 1952; Hooper and Thompson 1973), in discourse, a syntactic parentheti-
cal with a declarative host cannot be used to answer a question (Grimshaw 
2011), unlike a  declarative sentence with the parenthetical predicate in the 
main clause:
(15) What did Fred say?
(16) a. He said that he was an idiot./That he was an idiot.
b. *He was an idiot, he said./*He was, he said, an idiot.
Also interrogative host clauses in syntactic parentheticals are not used as 
requests for information:
(17) a. What, he wondered, was going to happen next?
b. *I haven’t a clue.
If the host clauses in syntactic parentheticals have the syntax and semantics 
of main declarative and interrogative clauses, but they do not have the prag-
matic functions of declaratives and interrogatives in that the former are not as-
sertions and the latter are not used as requests for information, the question 
that arises is how the parenthetical clause influences the pragmatic function 
of a  syntactic parenthetical. This is a  valid question, as Ifantidou (2001) has 
convincingly shown that parenthetical comments can be truth-conditional and 
such syntactic parentheticals could be expected to be make assertions. In this 
paper, I will follow Ifantidou (2001) and Jary (2011), who claim the function of 
6 See Grimshaw (2011) for a discussion of the apparent exception, the parenthetical I take it.
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parenthetical predicates is to indicate that the speaker does not take responsi-
bility for the content of the host clause in a syntactic parenthetical (cf. (4)−(5)) 
or for the content of the clause embedded under a parenthetical verb as in (1) 
and that she only takes responsibility for the contents of the clause including the 
parenthetical verb (cf. also Simons 2007). Assuming with Sperber et al. (2010) 
and Wilson (2011) that the speaker has two main goals in communication: that 
her audience understand her and that the audience believe what she is com-
municating or else the speaker’s utterance will not pass the epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms of the hearer, who needs to understand and to protect himself 
from being misinformed, the hearer does not only need to recover the degree of 
commitment communicated by the speaker, but he also needs to assess the cer-
tainty and reliability communicated by the speaker’s utterance to integrate the 
utterance in his cognitive environment. Wilson (2012: 32) suggests that the role 
of evidentials is to “display the communicator’s competence, benevolence and 
trustworthiness to the hearer.” Thus, the pragmatic function of parenthetical 
clauses seems to lie not only in activating and constraining the comprehension 
procedure, but also in activating the hearer’s epistemic assessment procedures 
which assess the reliability of the content of the communicated information as 
well as those which assess the reliability of the source of information. Even if the 
speaker indicates a high degree of commitment to the content communicated 
in the host clause, to the extent that she is not judged as reliable, the speaker’s 
utterance may still not pass the hearer’s epistemic vigilance mechanisms.7As 
I will show in this paper, the grammatical constraints on syntactic parenthet-
icals pointed out above as well as the constraints on the distributions of the 
parenthetical predicates themselves, which cannot include the component of 
factivity in their meaning, as demonstrated in (18) and which cannot fail to 
contribute some evidence for the truth of the host clause, as shown in (19) from 
Hooper and Thompson (1973), provide support for the relevance-theoretic ac-
count of parentheticals as guiding the assessment of the degree of the speaker’s 
commitment by the hearer, his assessment of the reliability of the source of in-
formation as well as the degree of strength that the hearer attributes to the in-
formation for the purposes of integrating it into his cognitive environment. 
(18) *Santa has lost a lot of weight, I regret.
(19) *Kissinger is negotiating for peace, it is likely.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2  discusses how 
parentheticals have been analysed in Relevance Theory. In Section 3, I offer 
7 The speaker’s utterance may fail to meet the hearer’s expectations of achieving maximum 
cognitive effects at the least cognitive effort if the speaker is judged as trustworthy, but she pro-
duces an inherently acceptable or an inherently unacceptable utterance (cf. Wilson 2011 for 
discussion).
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a relevance-theoretic account of the constraints on parenthetical comments. 
Section 4  provides conclusions. The analysis of the constraints on syntactic 
parentheticals is supported with data from English and Polish, as in both lan-
guages syntactic parentheticals have similar special grammatical properties. 
For example, że, the Polish cognate of the complementiser that introducing 
embedded declarative clauses in Polish does not have a null variant and its ab-
sence in the host clauses of the syntactic parenthetical in (20) provides even 
stronger evidence for the main point status of the host clause than in English, 
which has a null variant of the complementiser that.8 As will be shown in Sec-
tion 3, English and Polish parenthetical comments have similar semantic and 
pragmatic properties and are subject to similar distributional constraints.
(20) a. Myślę,  że/*Ø  Janek  wróci jutro.
 think-1sg that/Ø John comes.back tomorrow
 ‘I think (that) John will be back tomorrow.’
b. *Że/Ø Janek wróci jutro, myślę.
 That/Ø John comes.back think-1sg
 ‘John will be back tomorrow, I think.’
2. Evidential syntactic parenthetical clauses in Relevance Theory
In most general terms, relevance-theoretic studies of syntactic parentheticals 
offered by Blakemore (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009), Dehé and Kavalova (2006), 
Ifantidou (2001), and Kavalova (2007) (cf. also Carston 2002; Sperber and Wil-
son 1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 1993) have focused on explaining how 
parentheticals contribute to explicit and implicit communication and on elu-
cidating the types of meaning that they can encode. The parenthetical material 
(which can be a word, a phrase, or a clause) has been argued to assist the hearer 
in deriving the intended cognitive effects of an utterance and to help achieve 
optimal relevance, as it may diminish the effort of memory and inference by 
helping the hearer to achieve early and correct disambiguation and reference 
8 By contrast, interrogative host clauses do not offer direct evidence for the ban on the inter-
rogative complementiser in Polish, unlike English (cf. (7b)‒(7c)). The reason is that both main 
and embedded interrogative clauses are formed with the interrogative particle czy, as shown in 
(i) and (ii) respectively:
(i)  Czy  on  mnie  kocha? 
 Whether he me loves?
 ‘Does he love me?’
(ii)  a. Zastanawiałam się, czy/*Ø on mnie kocha.
  ‘I wondered whether/*Ø he loved me.’
 b. Czy/*Ø on mnie kocha, zastanawiałam się.
  ‘Does he love me? I wondered.’
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assignment (Dehé 2010: 308). The role of parenthetical comment clauses in 
achieving relevance for the available cost in processing effort has been linked 
mainly to their involvement in indicating the source of the speaker’s knowl-
edge and the speaker’s degree of certainty about the host proposition, hence to 
evidentiality broadly conceived (cf. note 2). 
The first comprehensive relevance-theoretic account of evidentials, includ-
ing syntactic parentheticals, is Ifantidou (2001). There, parenthetical com-
ments with verbs lexicalising attitudinal or speech-act description encode con-
ceptual information and contribute to the explicit conceptual content of their 
hosts. However, their contribution to the truth conditions of the utterances in 
which they occur may differ. When a parenthetical introduces information re-
lating to the speaker’s own point of view, the parenthetical will be perceived as 
inessential to the truth conditions of the utterance. Nevertheless, although the 
speaker does not assert the truth of the host proposition, she still expresses her 
commitment to its factuality, as in (21):9
(21) John is waiting at the airport, I think.
Ifantidou (2001) captures the contribution of the parenthetical comment in ut-
terances like (21) by suggesting that the parenthetical comment manifests the 
higher-level explicature of the proposition expressed in the host, which she calls 
the ground-floor proposition. This higher-level explicature is shown in (22):
(22) The speaker thinks that John is waiting at the airport.
By contributing not to the main explicature (the ground-floor proposition), 
but to the way in which the main explicature is interpreted for relevance, the 
parenthetical clause I think in (21) only affects the strength of the ground-floor 
proposition. In other words, what (21) communicates is (23a)−(23b):
(23) a. John is waiting at the airport.
b. The speaker thinks that (23a) is true.
That the addition of a parenthetical clause reduces the strength of the speak-
er’s commitment also in main parenthetical clauses such as (1b)−(1j) above is 
9 Wilson (1994: 24) defines commitment as part of the speaker’s expression of propositional 
attitude, which is concerned with “the strength of her belief in, certainty about or commit-
ment to the truth of her assertion.” Commitment figures in subsequent work in the Relevance 
Theory, including the study of epistemic modality by Papafragou (2006), evidentiality by Ifan-
tidou-Trouki (1993) and Ifantidou (2001), and declarative mood by Jary (2011). It is modelled 
explicitly from the speaker’s perspective in Moeschler (2013) and from the hearer’s perspective 
in Morency et al. (2008). In Papafragou (2006), certain epistemic modals have subjective in-
terpretations, conveying the speaker’s commitment to a base/host proposition. For Ifantidou 
(2001: 5), commitment is about the speaker’s degree of certainty about what she communicates. 
Assuming that a speaker aims at optimal relevance, to achieve the intended effects, her utterance 
must be strong enough to warrant processing.
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inherent in Jary’s (2011) account of assertion, where the speaker who makes an 
assertion takes on “assertoric responsibility” or commitment to act in accord-
ance with her assertion and its inferential consequences in subsequent verbal 
and non-verbal behaviour. Thus, uttering I think John is waiting at the airport, 
just as in uttering (21), the speaker takes assertoric responsibility only for the 
content of the parenthetical clause, i.e. the fact that she thinks that John is wait-
ing at the airport, but not for the content of the embedded/host clause. In Jary’s 
(2011) approach, the use of a parenthetical predicate with a declarative sentence 
indicates the speaker’s avoidance strategy, i.e. the avoidance to take assertoric 
responsibility for the first-order or ground-floor proposition.10
In Ifantidou’s (2001) account, the hearer needs to recover the intended in-
terpretation and the intended attitude towards the communicated contents, 
i.e. speaker’s commitment. Speaker’s commitment is recovered through the 
process of enrichment, specifically through the recovery of higher-level ex-
plicatures.11 In the absence of the parenthetical comment, e.g. when John is 
a spy is uttered, to satisfy his expectations of relevance,12 the hearer might have 
to pragmatically infer the speaker’s communicative intention in uttering p by 
choosing from a range of higher-level explicatures manifesting the degree of 
the speaker’s commitment, e.g. The speaker knows that p, The speaker thinks 
that p, The speaker believes that p, The speaker suggests that p, The speaker 
heard that p, The speaker imagines that p, The speaker is sure that p, etc. or her 
emotional attitude, e.g. The speaker fears that p, The speaker hopes that p, etc. 
(cf. also (1b)−(1j)). 
The strength of the evidence contributed by the parenthetical comment de-
pends on the degree of epistemic commitment that a verb lexicalizes. Thus, 
I  know, I  insist, Chomsky says have a  strengthening effect compared with 
I think, I fear. In normal circumstances, “the most accessible higher-level expli-
catures will be drawn from the set she thinks, she is fairly certain, she is certain 
10 Also Green (2000) in his semantic approach to assertion suggests that the role of a paren-
thetical comment with respect to the host clause is to communicate what he calls the speaker’s 
assertoric commitment to the host clause without the speaker asserting the proposition in the 
host clause. Like Ifantidou (2001) and Jary (2011), Green (2000) sees the role of the parentheti-
cal comments discussed here to consist in communicating the degree of the speaker’s commit-
ment to the truth of the proposition in the host/ground-floor proposition, which is a proposal 
to update the common ground. 
11 Also Papafragou (2006) recovers commitment at the level of explicatures in the case of 
epistemic modals.
12 As explained by Ifantidou (2001: 196), “[r]elevance is achieved by modifying a set of ex-
isting assumptions, by strengthening them, contradicting and eliminating them, or combin-
ing with them to yield contextual implications. An assumption with no strength can achieve 
relevance in none of these ways. Yet a speaker aiming at optimal relevance must intend her ut-
terance to be relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s attention. It follows that she must expect 
at least some of the assumptions expressed and implied by her utterance to be strong enough 
(i.e. evidenced enough) to achieve the intended effects.”
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and she knows” (Ifantidou 2001: 156). Other parenthetical indicators of the 
strength of commitment to the truth of the communicated proposition will 
thus normally have a weakening effect.
By contrast, when a parenthetical clause communicates not the speaker’s 
own but somebody else’s thoughts, for Ifantidou (2001), it marks the interpre-
tive (rather than descriptive) use of the parenthetical clause and thus contrib-
utes directly to the truth conditions of the utterance. In (24) below, unlike in 
(21), the speaker is not committed to the truth of the ground-floor proposition 
in the host clause:
(24) John is, you say, a spy.
This is because (24) is not a representation of the speaker’s thought, but the 
thought of her audience, as indicated by the parenthetical you say.
To capture the contribution of parenthetical comments to the interpreta-
tion of syntactic parentheticals containing them, Ifantidou (2001) proposes 
that the parenthetical and the host clause perform two separate speech-acts, 
one commenting on the other, as shown in (25) for (21) and in (26) for (24):13
(25) a. John is at the airport.
b. The speaker thinks this.
(26) a. John is a spy.
b. The audience say(s) this.
In each case, (a)&(b) are two separate propositions and each can be true or 
false in its own right. The function of (b) is to guide the interpretation of the 
utterance by encoding the higher-level explicature of (a). Hence, a parentheti-
cal serves to comment on the main clause: the utterance of (21) communicates 
the explicature in (25a), which will interact with the hearer’s assumptions to 
yield cognitive effects (e.g. it can be added to the common ground),14 while the 
higher-level explicature in (25b) contributes to relevance only by way of af-
fecting the strength of (25a). In (26), as (26b) is not the representation of the 
speaker’s thought, (26b) can be denied (Blakemore 2006: 1684):
(27) George, you say, is a liar (but I don’t believe it).
13 Ifantidou (2001) focuses on parentheticals interpolated into the host or following it such 
as John is a  spy, I  think, to the exclusion of sentence-initial parenthetical comments such as 
I  think, John is a  spy, as the latter may be impossible to distinguish from constructions with 
a parenthetical verb embedding a complement proposition such as I think (that) John is a spy.
14 In fact, the notion of common ground is replaced in RT with that of mutual cognitive en-
vironment, which, as Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 15‒21, 28‒31, 38‒46; see also Sperber and 
Wilson 2015) argue, is more psychologically appealing and avoids infinite regress that common 
ground generates. However, since the term common ground appears more familiar and may be 
viewed as theory-neutral, it will be used for the purposes of the present discussion.
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If a proposition which is relevant were a proposition of the thought which is 
the speaker’s own thought, it could not be denied (Blakemore 2006: 1681):
(28) George, as you said, is a liar (*but I don’t believe it).
In (28), the host proposition will be understood as the representation of the 
speaker’s thought, hence the speaker is asserting that George is a  liar while 
the function of the parenthetical is to indicate that the proposition resembles 
a thought already communicated by the audience. Thus, (28) with the bracket-
ed addition is a logical contradiction, the speaker asserting that George is a liar 
while at the same time denying that George is a liar. (27) is not a contradiction, 
as saying (27) the speaker communicates that the proposition that George is 
not a liar is not her own thought. 
To summarize, in her analysis, Ifantidou (2001) assumes that the speak-
er chooses to communicate her information with an evidential parenthetical 
clause in a syntactic parenthetical in contexts in which the hearer could recover 
“the wrong higher-level explicature, or the wrong degree of strength, or might 
be in doubt as to which higher-level explicature, and which degree of strength 
was intended” (Ifantidou 2001: 156).The main role that parenthetical com-
ments play in this approach is in indicating the speaker’s degree of commit-
ment for the purposes of meeting the hearer’s expectations of relevance so that 
the hearer will choose the first and the most accessible assumption which has 
cognitive effects with the least processing effort. 
Ifantidou’s (2001) approach thus focuses on the role that the reliability of 
the content of the message plays in communication. However, as pointed out 
by Sperber et al. (2010) and Wilson (2011), the reliability of the information 
source also plays a vital role in making the hearer believe or reject the com-
municated assumption. Sperber et al. (2010) suggest that two assessment pro-
cedures constitute the cognitive mechanism called epistemic vigilance which 
protects the hearer from being intentionally or accidentally misinformed: the 
mechanism for the assessment of the trustworthiness of the content of 
the communicated information and the mechanism for the assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the information source. What this means is that to be not 
only understood, but also to be believed, the speaker must choose appropriate 
linguistic means to pass the hearer’s epistemic vigilance mechanisms. Wilson 
(2011: 22−25) suggests that the use of procedurals like but, therefore etc., may 
not be motivated by the need to constrain the hearer’s comprehension process 
so that he arrives at the right inferences without undue effort, but rather, it may 
serve to activate the assessment procedures, i.e. the epistemic vigilance mecha-
nism. Building on Ifantidou (2001) and Wilson (2011), I would like to suggest 
in this contribution that the speaker chooses to use a parenthetical comment 
not only to persuade the hearer to accept the content communicated in the 
host clause, but, by disclosing the source of the information, also to persuade 
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the hearer of her reliability and trustworthiness. That both the reliability of the 
content and the reliability of the source of the information play a role in com-
prehension is demonstrated by the constraints on the distribution and inter-
pretation of parenthetical comments in syntactic parentheticals in both Eng-
lish and Polish, as discussed in the next section.
3. Constraints on syntactic parentheticals: evidence 
from English and Polish
3.1. The requirement that the epistemicity of the parentheti-
cal comment is upward-directed
If each clause in a  syntactic parenthetical contributes a  proposition which 
could be true or false in its own right, the question might be posed why the 
integration of the propositions should require that the parenthetical comment 
be associated with a degree of certainty that is upward-directed. That the de-
gree of speaker commitment must be upwards in syntactic parentheticals, 
but not in main-clauses with a parenthetical verb as the matrix clause verb, is 
shown in (29)−(30), adapted from Jackendoff (1972: 97, 99). The distribution 
of evidential parenthetical adverbials is governed by the same requirement, as 
shown in (31) from Jackendoff (1972: 99):
(29) a. I think John is a fink.
b. John is a fink, I think. 
c. John is, I think, a fink.
(30) a. I don’t think/I doubt John is a fink. 
b. *John is, I don’t think/I doubt, a fink.
(31) a. Truthfully/Honestly/Sincerely, I can’t tell you the answer.
b. *Falsely/Dishonestly/Insincerely, I can’t tell you the answer.
Polish evidential parenthetical comments as well as evidential adverbials have 
similar distributional properties:
(32) Nie sądzę/Wątpię, że są nieproszonymi gośćmi.
‘I don’t think/I doubt they are unwelcome guests.’
(33) a. Ale to są, jak sądzę/jak nie wątpię, nieproszeni goście.15
 ‘But they are, I think/I don’t doubt, unwelcome guests.’
b. *Ale to są, jak nie sądzę/jak wątpię, nieproszeni goście.
 ‘*But they are, as I don’t think/as I doubt, unwelcome guests.’
15 The Polish examples in (33a), (34a) and (35a) are taken from National Corpus of Polish 
(http://www.nkjp.pl/index.php?page=0&lang=1).
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(34) a. To był sen – powiedziała cicho Joanna.
 ‘It was a dream, Joanna said quietly.’
b. *To był sen – nie powiedziała cicho Joanna. 
 ‘It was a dream, Joanna didn’t  say quietly.’
(35) a. Prawdę mówiąc/Uczciwie mówiąc/Szczerze mówiąc, zawaliłam sprawę.
 ‘Truthfully/Honestly/Sincerely speaking, I’ve messed up.’
b. *Mówiąc nieprawdę/Nieuczciwie mówiąc/Nieszczerze mówiąc, zawaliłam sprawę.
 ‘*Falsely/Dishonestly/Insincerely speaking, I’ve messed up.’
Interestingly, grammaticalized evidentials in both English and Polish all 
seem to be upward-directed: 
(36) English: beyond all doubt, no doubt, for sure, for certain, etc.
Polish: szczerze mówiąc ‘sincerely speaking,’ prawdę mówiąc ‘speaking the truth,’ 
bez wątpienia ‘beyond any doubt,’ bez cienia wątpliwości ‘without a shred of doubt,’ 
z całą pewnością ‘in all certainty,’ po prawdzie ‘in truth,’ etc.
As Sperber et al. (2010) and Wilson (2011) argue, the cognitive mechanisms 
for epistemic vigilance oblige the speaker to be trustworthy and reliable since 
if they were not, they would risk losing the hearer’s trust in the long run. As 
hearers access the information they are presented both with an eye to the reli-
ability of its content and the reliability of its source, speakers should link their 
information to the hearers’ background assumptions, i.e. speakers must show 
how the information they present logically follows or is strongly supported by 
the hearers’ background assumptions or beliefs and they must convince hear-
ers that they are trustworthy. Hence the evidence supporting the inferential 
process aimed at the recovery of the informative intention of the utterance 
must be reliable. I suggest here that this reliability can be made manifest by the 
use of upward-directed predicates, which provide explicit support for the va-
lidity of the host proposition and can thus contribute to convincing the hear-
er that the speaker can be trusted. By contrast, the use of downward-direct-
ed evidential parentheticals and adverbials would undermine the assumption 
that the communicator is competent, benevolent and trustworthy. While the 
speaker may have doubts about or even deny the truth of the host proposition 
and may communicate her doubts or denial, as in (30a) or (32) respectively as 
a representation of her own thought, the epistemic vigilance mechanism pre-
vents her from using disbeliefs and doubts to express her commitment, since 
this would prevent the hearer from assessing her as a reliable source of infor-
mation, which the unacceptability of (30b), (33b) and (34b) demonstrates. The 
upward-directed requirement on evidential parenthetical comments thus of-
fers evidence that to be assessed as a reliable source of information, the speaker 
must present a proposition that she at least believes to be possible.
Furthermore, the effect of negating a  downward-entailing predi-
cate is that the host proposition can be interpreted as reliable, i.e. negation 
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of  a  down ward-entailing produces an evidential comment that expresses 
a high degree of certainty and contributes to assessing the speaker as reliable:16
(37) Mushrooms are great on diets, I don’t doubt (Ross 1973).
(38) It’s a long shot, I don’t deny (Hooper 1975).
(39) Nie dlatego, że byłem jakimś fantastycznym partnerem, ale dlatego, że w  takich 
momentach zawsze jest trudno, a  do tego przyzwyczaiłaś się do mnie i  –  nie 
wątpię – pokochałaś.
‘It’s not that I’ve been such a terrific partner for you but because it’s always difficult 
to be on your own in such situations and besides, you’ve grown accustomed to me 
and – I don’t doubt – you’ve grown to love me.’
(40) Bywam tchórzem, nie przeczę. 
‘I can be a coward at times, I don’t deny.’
3.2. The ban on the use of weak evidential predicates 
in parenthetical comments
Although both predicates like to be sure, to be obvious, to be certain and pred-
icates to be possible, to be likely, to be probable are upward-entailing, the lat-
ter are unacceptable as parenthetical comments in syntactic parentheticals. 
The English examples in (41)−(46) are drawn from Hooper (1975) and Hoop-
er and Thompson (1973). The unacceptable Polish examples in (47)−(49) are 
modelled on their acceptable counterparts (50)−(52) drawn from the National 
Corpus of Polish:
(41) *Kissinger is negotiating for peace, it’s likely. 
(42) *Many of the applicants are women, it’s likely. 
(43) *Factivity is important in other constructions as well, it’s probable.
(44) Kissinger was negotiating for peace, it was certain/I was sure.
(45) Many of the applicants were women, it was certain/I was sure.
(46) Factivity is important in other constructions as well, it’s obvious/I’m sure.
(47) *Skończyły się beztroskie czasy, to prawdopodobne.
‘The carefree days are over, it’s probable.’
(48) *Nic nie znaleźli, to prawdopodobne.
‘They haven’t found anything, it’s probable.’
(49) *Wyrzucili go, to możliwe.
‘They have fired him, it’s likely.’
16 (39) and (40) are from the National Corpus of Polish.
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(50) Skończyły się beztroskie czasy, to oczywiste/jestem pewna.
‘The carefree days are over, it’s obvious/I’m sure.’
(51) Nic nie znaleźli, to pewne/jestem pewien.
‘They haven’t found anything, it’s certain/I’m sure.’
(52) Wyrzucili go, to pewne.
‘They have fired him, it’s certain/I’m sure.’
If the contribution of parenthetical comment clauses under discussion is to 
alter the context for the interpretation of the host/main clause, the comment 
must provide evidence for the speaker’s commitment. Both to be likely and to 
be certain indicate a high degree of certainty. Yet, only the latter are licensed in 
syntactic parentheticals. In line with Ifantidou’s analysis of evidential adverbi-
als, the difference seems to lie in the fact that predicates like to be possible do not 
have any positive evidential content in and of themselves while predicates like 
to be certain implicate the existence of evidence for the host proposition.
Ifantidou (2001) analyses parenthetical adverbials like apparently, seemingly, 
obviously, clearly as evidential and adverbials like possibly and probably as non-
evidential. Apparently and seemingly alter the context for the interpretation of 
the host/main clause, as they suspend the speaker’s commitment to the propo-
sition that falls within their scope. Consequently, evidence that would have fal-
sified a stronger assertion no longer counts as falsifying evidence. As such, ap-
parently and seemingly are clearly truth-conditional (Ifantidou 2001: 152). The 
speaker of (53) is not committed to the truth of (54) but the truth of (55):
(53) a. John is, apparently, a spy.
b. John is, seemingly, a spy.
(54) John is a spy.
(55) It seems/appears that John is a spy.
Since they are truth-conditional evidentials, apparently and seemingly fall 
within the scope of factive connectives. The speaker uttering (56) is commit-
ted to the truth of (57), but not to the truth of (58):
(56) a. Although John is, apparently, a spy, he is very charming.
b. Because John is, seemingly, a spy, we should avoid him.
(57) a. Although it appears that John is a spy, he is very charming.
b. Because it seems that John is a spy, we should avoid him.
(58) a. Although John is a spy, he is very charming.
b. Because John is a spy, we should avoid him.
As an evidential adverbial like apparently ensures that the speaker is put-
ting forward the proposition that John is a spy with a very reduced degree of 
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strength (a  degree determined by the semantic content of the adverbial), it 
is a commitment-suspending ‘weak evidential’ on Ifantidou’s (2001: 153) ac-
count. Similar modification of the truth-conditional status of the host/main 
clause is achieved with the help of non-evidential possibly and probably. Since 
they reduce the range of falsifying evidence, they are perceived as ‘weak.’
By contrast, obviously p  and clearly p  are referred to as ‘strong eviden-
tials’ (Ifantidou 2001: 153), as the speaker’s commitment to the proposition 
is strengthened, and it is implied that there is clear evidence for p. The truth-
conditional status of the utterance is altered because the range of falsifying evi-
dence is altered (increased). I suggest here building on Ifantidou (2001) that to 
be possible, to be probable as well as their Polish counterparts are unavailable as 
parenthetical comments in syntactic parentheticals, because although they in-
dicate that the speaker considers the host proposition to be epistemically pos-
sible, they fail to provide evidence for the truth of the host proposition and as 
a result, the utterance is not strong enough to warrant the hearer’s cognitive 
effort needed to process it and as the speaker cannot be assessed as a reliable 
source of the information, her utterance cannot get past the hearer’s mecha-
nisms of epistemic vigilance.
3.3. The requirement that the host clause update the common 
ground
As observed by Hooper and Thompson (1973: 481), a factive verb, which pre-
supposes its semantic argument, cannot be used in the parenthetical comment 
in a syntactic parenthetical:
(59) *Santa has lost a lot of weight, I regret.
Further examples from English and Polish are given in (60)–(63) below:
(60) *John will, I deny, be late.
(61) *Bernard has forgotten the meeting, it bothers me.
(62) *Kochałam go, żałuję.
‘I loved him, I regret.’
(63) *On jest moim wrogiem, zaprzeczam.
‘He is my enemy, I deny.’
If semantic arguments of factive verbs are presuppositional, i.e. their truth is 
already taken for granted, the host proposition cannot update the common 
ground and thus satisfy the hearer’s expectation of relevance. A proposal to 
update the common ground should be challengeable (Stalnaker 2002), i.e. the 
hearer should be able to decide whether to add the proposition to the common 
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ground or not. If the host propositions in (60)−(63) are already part of the 
common ground, by uttering (60)−(63), the speaker fails to contribute a pro-
position which could achieve relevance, i.e. whose processing could modify 
the existing assumptions in the hearer’s cognitive environment (cf. note 12) 
and yield cognitive effects compensating the cognitive effort needed to process 
the information and his expectations of relevance could not be met. 
 That the host clause must have information focus in a syntactic par-
enthetical is further supported by the unavailability of evidentials like I know, 
I heard, I saw and their Polish cognates in contexts like (64) and (65), where 
the speaker proposes to add her information to the common ground. While 
the hearer can confirm that this assumption is part of his cognitive environ-
ment, he cannot do so using a construction with a parenthetical comment, in 
which the known message is afforded the main point status:
(64) A: Betty is alive.
B: I know that Betty is alive.
B’: *Betty is alive, I know/I heard/I saw.
(65) A: Jan już przyjechał. 
 ‘John is already back.’
B: Wiem/słyszałem/widziałem, że Jan już przyjechał. 
 ‘I already know that John is back.’
B’: *Jan już przyjechał, wiem/słyszałem/widziałem. 
 ‘Jan is already back, I know/I heard/I saw.’
To the extent that the host proposition is not discourse-new information and 
does not have information focus, processing the parenthetical comment can-
not satisfy the hearer’s expectations of relevance, as processing the parentheti-
cal comment cannot lead to cognitive effects matching the cognitive processing 
effort. For the processing of the parenthetical to have cognitive effects adequate 
to the processing effort, the context for the interpretation of the utterance must 
be altered and the degree of speaker commitment must change, which is not 
the case in (64) and (65). What the difference between, for example (64B) and 
(64B’), indicates is that an evidential verb like know can be used in a  clause 
with the main point status (64B), as there, it communicates the speaker’s strong 
commitment to the truth of the embedded claim, processing which thus alters 
the hearer’s cognitive environment. In (64B’), the speaker focuses information 
which is already part of the common ground and thus the communicated infor-
mation cannot meet the hearer’s expectations of relevance.
In contrast to factive parenthetical verbs, complements of semi-factives 
like to know, to notice, to realize, to learn, to discover have been independently 
shown not to be necessarily presuppositional. These verbs can be used in par-
enthetical comments, as observed by Hooper and Thompson (1973: 480) for 
English and as further illustrated for Polish with (69)−(71), drawn from the 
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National Corpus of Polish. The utterances below are acceptable, demonstrat-
ing that for the host proposition to meet the hearer’s expectations of relevance, 
it must be focused to alter the hearer’s cognitive environment:
(66) Santa has lost a lot of weight, I notice.
(67) She was a compulsive liar, he soon realized.
(68) Many problems remain to be solved, I learned.
(69) Założyć firmę nie jest trudno, wiem, bo sam niedawno zakładałem.
‘It is not difficult to start a business, I know because I have recently started mine.’
(70) O tym Dolid nie napisał, uświadomił sobie marszałek.
‘Dolid hasn’t written about that, the marshal realised.’
(71) Przecież to właściwie ja pierwszy ją poznałem, uświadomił sobie nagle Julek.
‘Yet it was me, actually, who first got to know her, Julek suddenly discovered.’
3.4. The requirement that the parenthetical comment modify 
a proposition unmarked for illocutionary force
As already noticed in Section 1 above, a host clause in a syntactic parentheti-
cal construction cannot be infinitival, gerundial or subjunctive. Rather, it must 
be finite (Grimshaw 2011; Hooper and Thompson 1973), as illustrated in (8)−
(10) above, repeated here for convenience as (72)−(74), as well as in (75) for 
English and in (76)−(77) for Polish:
(72) a. I promised them that I would leave.
b. I would leave, I promised them.
(73) a. I promised them to leave.
b. *To leave, I promised them.
(74) a. I insisted that she learn to sing.
b. *That she learn to sing, I insisted.
(75) a. I imagine living in a place where there are no cars.
b. *Living in a place where there are no cars, I imagine.
(76) a. Właściwie obiecałem jej nie powiedzieć nikomu.
 ‘I actually promised her not to tell anyone.’
b. *Nie powiedzieć nikomu, właściwie obiecałem jej.
 ‘*Not tell anyone, I actually promised her.’
(77) a. Wyobrażam sobie mieszkanie pod jednym dachem z jakimś facetem.
 ‘I imagine living with a guy under the same roof.’
b. *Mieszkanie z jakimś facetem pod jednym dachem, wyobrażam sobie.
 ‘*Living with a guy under the same roof, I imagine.’
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Independently of the constraints on the use of preference predicates as par-
enthetical comments, which require an independent explanation, the utter-
ances given above demonstrate that the host clause must be finite. If the rel-
evance of syntactic parenthetical comments lies in the information that they 
communicate about the truth-conditional content of their hosts, the hosts 
must be finite as only finite clauses can make manifest the propositional at-
titude the speaker intends to express with her utterance. If the host does not 
indicate mood-related information, the hearer is unable to recover the high-
er-level explicature that mood indicators encode. For example, declarative/in-
dicative mood is associated with the propositional attitude of belief (cf. Wilson 
2011). In the absence of mood indicators that enable the development of logi-
cal form into full propositional content, including the speaker’s propositional 
attitude, the host cannot serve as input for the propositional attitude or speech 
act operator in the logical structure of a parenthetical verb to perform its func-
tion of weakening or strengthening the speaker’s commitment to the truth of 
the host proposition. The hearer thus cannot be guided towards a hypothesis 
about the speaker’s propositional attitude and cannot infer the speaker’s com-
mitment to the truth of the host. 4. Conclusion
In this paper I have investigated several constraints on the distribution of par-
enthetical predicates in syntactic parentheticals in English and Polish, focus-
ing on the properties of syntactic parentheticals that are responsible for their 
special pragmatic status. I have shown here that the special properties of syn-
tactic parentheticals can be given a  uniform explanation in relevance-theo-
retic terms. Ifantidou’s (2001) assumption that the speaker chooses to com-
municate her information with an evidential parenthetical comment clause 
in a syntactic parenthetical in contexts in which the hearer could recover “the 
wrong higher-level explicature, or the wrong degree of strength, or might be in 
doubt as to which higher-level explicature, and which degree of strength was 
intended” (Ifantidou 2001: 156) can explain why the parenthetical comment 
cannot be downward-entailing, why the host clause must update the common 
ground and why the host clause cannot be unmarked for illocutionary force. 
To meet the hearer’s expectations of relevance and add to his cognitive envi-
ronment, the speaker’s communicated information must be strong and well-
evidenced. Unless the information is communicated with some degree of 
commitment and is well-evidenced, it will not get past the hearer’s epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms. Interestingly, it is also the constraints on syntactic par-
entheticals in different languages, as is evidenced here for English and Polish, 
that offer support for these assumptions.
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